The global shift towards Remote Tower operations, where air traffic services are delivered from a centralised facility rather than from a conventional control tower, has prompted strong safety warnings from the International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations (IFALPA) and the European Cockpit Association (ECA). In a new Joint Position Paper released on 25 November 2025, the two organisations argue that existing industry practices and regulatory frameworks have not kept pace with the rapid rollout of this technology.
Remote Towers, also referred to as Digital or Virtual Towers, use high-definition cameras, sensors and data links to allow Air Traffic Control Officers (ATCOs) to manage aerodrome operations from an off-site Remote Tower Centre (RTC). Some RTCs are designed to control several airports simultaneously, a concept promoted in ICAO’s Aviation System Block Upgrade (ASBU) framework.
However, what has been widely advertised as a modernisation initiative may also introduce significant risks to flight operations, risks that, according to IFALPA and ECA, have not been fully assessed.
A Fundamental Shift in Assumptions
Traditionally, ICAO rules assume that a destination airport and its designated alternate are operationally independent. This is critical: should a diversion be necessary, pilots must have access to fully functional air traffic services at their alternate aerodrome.
The introduction of Remote Towers challenges this assumption. If both the destination and its alternate are controlled from the same RTC, a technical failure, cyber-incident, or loss of data connection could compromise ATC provision at both aerodromes simultaneously.
The paper argues that regulators and service providers initially focused almost exclusively on ATCO requirements, treating the controller as the sole “end user” while overlooking the impact on pilots, operators, and wider flight operations. As a result, key ICAO documents such as Annex 6 and the Flight Planning and Fuel Management Manual have yet to be updated to reflect these new structures.
Operational Contingency vs Technical Redundancy
Many Remote Tower systems boast multiple communication links intended to ensure continuity. But the pilot associations warn that technical redundancy does not guarantee operational integrity.
A closed or degraded RTC, even for a short period, could prevent access to a runway at both a destination and its alternate. Despite this, the responsibility for maintaining safe operations in a Remote Tower environment remains “unclear”, the paper states.
Transparency for airlines and crews is particularly important, the organisations stress. Operators need to know which airports are controlled from which RTCs in order to make informed decisions during flight planning.
Controversy Over ‘Multiple Mode of Operation’
One of the most debated features of Remote Tower technology is the “multiple mode of operation”, in which a single ATCO provides simultaneous ATS to more than one aerodrome. IFALPA and ECA note that this model lacks scientific validation, particularly concerning human performance, workload management, and communication risks.
The use of combined frequencies, new radio routines, and simultaneous situational awareness across several aerodromes represent areas where, they argue, safety evidence remains thin. For this reason, the organisations do not support the implementation of simultaneous multi-aerodrome control.
They draw a distinction, however, between this and “sequential” control, where a controller manages several airports, but only one at a time. This, they say, should be considered an extension of traditional single-airport operations, not a fundamentally new mode.
Recommendations to ICAO and Regulators
IFALPA and ECA are therefore currently calling for:
- Clear regulations governing ATS provision to multiple aerodromes from a single Remote Tower Centre.
- Prohibition on selecting an alternate aerodrome that is controlled by the same RTC as the destination, unless robust contingency arrangements guarantee immediate access to a runway.
- A review of ICAO Annex 6 and Doc 9976 to update flight-planning and alternate-protection requirements for the Remote Tower era.
Safety First: A Call for Assessment
The pilot organisations emphasise that Remote Towers must only be introduced following full Safety Assessments that comply with ICAO Annex 11 and PANS-ATM requirements. These assessments, they say, should be transparent and accessible to operational end users, not held solely within regulatory or engineering circles.
Ultimately, IFALPA and ECA support technological innovation, but insist that modernisation must never dilute established safety margins. Remote Towers, they conclude, must deliver performance and service quality that is equal to or better than that of traditional air traffic services.
